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When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, Serbia rejected this move as a fundamental threat to its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national identity. The Serbian government, however, shifted its foreign policy approach in 2010 when it started to gradually relinquish its claim of territorial control over Kosovo through a series of European Union (EU)-sponsored BelgradePristina negotiations. The only red line Serbia vowed not to cross was the recognition of Kosovo's independence. Throughout this period of profound policy change, the discourse about the centrality of Kosovo to Serbia's state identity remained intact.
What explains Serbia's continuing treatment of Kosovo as its Holy Land while simultaneously giving up its effective sovereign rights in the province? One of the central assumptions within the realist canon of international relations scholarship is that the primary goal of states is to achieve physical security-defined in terms of survival, power, and sovereignty.
1 Realist scholarship would therefore have a hard time explaining Serbia's seemingly irrational Kosovo policy. Existing discussions of territorial conflicts over sacred spaces can offer three additional explanations. 2 According to the materialist approach, the policies of the parties engaged in the conflict over any territory arise from strategic interaction and bargaining process among rational actors.
3 Materialist explanations can illuminate why Serbia gave up physical control over Kosovo (i.e., due to lack of material capabilities to change the status quo). Nevertheless, they fail to answer why Serbia continues to defy formal recognition of Kosovo, thus incurring significant political cost. Social constructivists, on the other hand, treat the importance of a certain territory to a political or religious community as a social fact, shaped by long-term discourses and practices that heavily constrain the freedom of political elites to act. 4 Constructivists offer valuable insights about the evolution and institutionalization of norms and beliefs about the importance of certain territories, as well as about collective identities thus constructed. However, they often stop short of explaining the role of elites in changing those practices, and sideline the governmental logic driving them. Finally, interpretivist accounts are interested in what a certain sacred territory means to political or religious actors on the ground, and take those beliefs at face value.
5 At best, interpretivist accounts offer a valuable snapshot of the inside-out perspective about the value of a sacred territory (such as Kosovo) for political and religious actors. However, they often fail to go beyond that into the social origins of the policy vis-à-vis the territory and the governmental logic behind it. Another danger of purely interpretivist accounts is in contributing to an already essentialized image of the world often shared by political and religious actors themselves, with possibly pernicious implications.
This chapter does not aim to offer a superior paradigm that can overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings. Instead, we offer a different perspective by attempting to understand political rationality and governmental logic behind Serbia's seemingly irrational and contradictory Kosovo strategies. Taking cues from Foucault's concept of governmentality, we argue that Serbia's Kosovo policy is a form of technology of pastoral power exercised not over a territory but over a population. Its aim is not to keep control over a territory [Kosovo] and defend the state's "physical security, " but first and foremost to keep control over its own population and preserve Serbia's "ontological security" through the monopoly over a specific, national, religiously infused master-narrative.
